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I. INTRODUCTION
“The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality,
but it has not stood in isolation from developments in law and
society.” 1
As Justice Kennedy aptly pointed out, the institution of
marriage has developed from roots that run deep into human
evolution. Divorce emerged as a means for parties to dissolve a
legal relationship. For much of our history, domestic relations
law reflected religious values that looked unfavorably on

J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Lincoln Memorial University. The
author would like to thank Professor April James for inspiring this
Note. This was just one of the many spirited domestic relations
debates that we had over the last two years. Also, Duncan School of
Law Dean of Academics Matthew Lyon contributed a great deal of
time critiquing this Note. Dean Lyon has, without question, raised
the level of my writing over the past three years. Thank you to both
of these professors for your time and insight.
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015).
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divorce. 2 Remedies required proof that at least one party failed
to conform to society’s expectations—a fault-based divorce.
Time brings change. Divorce law’s grip on the reigns of
marriage loosened during the twentieth century. 3
Modern divorce laws have no-fault options firmly
entrenched in all fifty states. 4 As discussed in more detail
below, the manner and process by which parties use no-fault
divorce differs significantly across the country. Some states,
including Tennessee, ask litigants to overcome significant
hurdles to use no-fault grounds. 5 Other states have diverged
from these restrictive requirements, allowing litigants to plead
no-fault grounds that allow a court to decide any disputed
ancillary issues. 6 Some states moved even further, removing
fault grounds completely. 7 Despite some ominous forecast, 8
pure no-fault divorce has proved sufficient to dissolve legal
relationships without damaging society as a whole.
No-fault opponents have relied on varying economic
and moral arguments to further a religion-based agenda that
does not reflect current societal realities. 9 Aggrieved parties
already have access to more efficient criminal and tort law
remedies. These systems, by design, correct and expel
unwanted conduct more efficiently than do equity-focused
domestic relations laws. Moreover, significant declines in
religious affiliation demonstrate a marked change in societal
values. 10 Divorce law should reflect this evolution and provide
efficient, equitable dissolution to marital relationships.
Tennessee should progress toward a pure no-fault
system. The law currently places an unnecessary burden on no-

See Deborah H. Bell, Family Law at the Turn of the Century, 71 MISS.
L.J. 781, 782-85 (2002).
3 Id.
4 See David P. Horowitz, Breaking Up Is [Easier] To Do, 82 N.Y. ST. B.J.
18 (2010).
5 See e.g., infra note 11.
6 See infra note 56.
7 See infra note 58.
8 See infra Part IV.
9 See id.; see also infra Part V.
10 See infra Part V.
2
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fault divorce that requires both parties to agree on all issues. 11
This requirement escalates contentiousness, increases costs, and
unnecessarily complicates future disputes over children and
alimony. A pure no-fault system, or a move in that direction
that removes the agreement requirement, would increase access
to the courts for those who need it most. The steadily decreasing
number of people that affiliate with marriage’s founding father,
religion, 12 should cause lawmakers to reevaluate the current
statutory requirements and reconsider Tennessee’s restricted
access.
This Note will discuss various reasons for Tennessee to
move toward a pure no-fault divorce system. Part II will discuss
the historical developments leading to the current system; part
III categorizes the three types of no-fault divorce used across
the fifty states; part IV will address several common themes
among fault proponents; part V focuses on the significance of
religion in divorce laws; and part VI discusses several reasons
for changing Tennessee’s no-fault divorce statute.

II. DIVORCE LAW’S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Divorce laws have changed over time to coincide with
the evolution of marriage. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
in Obergefell recognized that marriage was not an unchanging
institution but a reflection of societal values effectuated in the
law. 13 Divorce laws have followed along this same path.

A. DEVELOPMENT OF FAULT-BASED GROUNDS FOR
DIVORCE
Divorce in the newly formed United States looked to
English ecclesiastical courts for guiding precedent. 14 Similar to
corporations, many pre-twentieth century divorces came
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (West, WestlawNext current
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly).
12 See infra note 103.
13 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
14 Adiaen M. Morse Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of ReInjecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 607
(1996).
11
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through legislative acts. 15 This cumbersome system gave way
to a statutorily created fault-based divorce. Courts relied on the
concept of full-fault divorce to dissolve a marriage. 16 Full-fault’s
narrow proposition required an innocent spouse’s proof that
the other committed some marital misconduct to grant the
divorce. 17 This process proved insufficient as time progressed,
eventually giving rise to the concept of no-fault divorce.
The progression of fault-based divorce law exhibited a
delayed reflection of societal view of morality. Initially, states
recognized adultery as the only ground for absolute divorce. 18
States expanded fault-based grounds during the twentieth
century to include variations of cruelty and abandonment. 19
Interestingly, New York held on to a narrow, antiquated,
adultery-only definition of fault until 1966, causing director
Woody Allen to quip, “while the Ten Commandments forbid
adultery, New York demands it if you want a divorce.” 20 Faultbased grounds for divorce sufficed throughout most of the
twentieth century, but America’s liberalization in the 1960s
proved too much for these aging laws. California become the
first state to implement a pure no-fault system. 21
During the 1960s, the California legislature recognized
that the fault-based paradigm failed to address the obvious—
most divorces were actually uncontested dissolutions. 22 The
pre-1970 system was fraught with divorces based on false
claims of cruelty used to comply with the fault requirement. 23
California’s current no-fault statute only permits divorce for
Id.
Ira M. Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic
Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 719, 722-24 (1997).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See Bell, supra note 2, at 783-84.
20 See Gabriella L. Zborovsky, Note, Baby Steps to “Grown-Up”
Divorce: The Introduction of the Collaborative Family Law Center and the
Continued Need for True No-Fault Divorce in New York, 10 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 305, 305 (2008).
21 Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312, 3314-51; see
Bell, supra note 2, at 784.
22 Herma Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75
CAL. L. REV. 291, 297-98 (1987).
23 Id. at 297.
15
16
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irreconcilable differences, 24 and developed on the theory that
fault-based divorce no longer served the public interest. 25

B. NO-FAULT DIVORCE GAINS TRACTION ACROSS THE
UNITED STATES
No-fault divorce allowed parties to avoid many
undesirable and all-too-common occurrences in full-fault
divorce proceedings. Across the country, fault-based grounds
caused collusion and deception between parties to provide
courts with sufficient proof to meet statutory requirements. 26
Currently, all fifty states have adopted some form of no-fault
divorce that avoids this charade. 27
States have used no-fault divorce to provide a level of
homeostasis between societal values and the law. Because
values differ from state to state, divorce laws reflect the
principle that states can and should differ. Despite some subtle
differences, the basic reasoning behind no-fault divorce
revolves around the following principles:
[T]o strengthen and preserve the integrity of
marriage and safeguard family relationships; to
promote the amicable settlement of disputes that
have arisen between parties to a marriage; to
mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and
their children caused by the process of legal
dissolution of marriage; to make reasonable
provision for the spouse and minor children
during and after litigation; and to make the law
of legal dissolution of marriage effective for
dealing with the realities of matrimonial
experience by making irretrievable breakdown

CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, WestlawNext current with urgency
legislation through Chapter 893 of 2016 Reg.Sess., Ch. 8 of 2015-2016
2nd Ex.Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot).
25 Kay, supra note 22, at 299.
26 Bell, supra note 2, at 784.
27 See infra Part III.
24
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of the marriage relationship the sole basis for its
dissolution. 28
Keeping with these principles, Tennessee, for example, now
allows parties to plead irreconcilable differences or to claim to
have lived apart continuously for a period of two years. 29 States
can be placed into three distinct categories based on how the
state allows parties to access no-fault grounds.

III. NO-FAULT DIVORCE STATUTES AND THE CONSEQUENCES
States can experiment with new laws that reflect societal
values and address specific needs. As a result, no-fault statutes
took on different forms throughout the United States.
Predictably, different beliefs emerged within the language of
these laws. The following three categories demonstrate how
states have diverged from the traditional fault-based paradigm.

A. NO-FAULT ALTERNATIVE IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES
Rather than allow unfettered access to no-fault divorce,
some states placed significant limitations on those grounds. 30
These limitations come in several different forms. 31 Some states
24 GEORGE BLUM ET AL., AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE § 2 No-fault
divorce (2d ed. 2016).
29 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-4-101(14)-(15) (West, WestlawNext current
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly).
30 See. e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (West, WestlawNext current with
legislation passed during the 2016 Session of the Georgia General
Assembly). Georgia law withholds any divorce on this ground be
granted until at least 30 days after serving the respondent. See also
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-42 (West, WestlawNext current through
Act 1 (End) of the 2016 Second Special Session, pending revision by
the revisor of statutes).
31 Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current
through 2016 released chapters 1-396), with GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3
(West, WestlawNext current with legislation passed during the 2016
Session of the Georgia General Assembly). Some no-fault statutes
require complete agreement between the litigants on all ancillary
issues, while other no-fault agreement requirements leverage
litigants to avoid unnecessary appearances or time.
28
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require significant waiting periods before entering a no-fault
divorce decree. 32 In Arkansas, a couple must live apart for
eighteen months to obtain a no-fault divorce. 33 Other states vary
the waiting period depending on the no-fault ground. 34 New
Jersey allows an agreed divorce based on irreconcilable
differences after a six-month wait, while a less agreeable couple
must live apart for eighteen months before divorce is granted. 35
A number of states still require complete agreement as
a prerequisite to no-fault grounds. 36 To avoid proving fault in
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(c) (West, WestlawNext current
through the end of the 2016 Second Extraordinary, 2016 Fiscal, and
2016 Third Extraordinary Sessions of the 90th Arkansas General
Assembly, and include changes made by the Arkansas Code
Revision Commission received through May 1, 2016).
33 Id.
34 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301 (West, WestlawNext current
through the end of the 2016 Second Extraordinary, 2016 Fiscal, and
2016 Third Extraordinary Sessions of the 90th Arkansas General
Assembly, and include changes made by the Arkansas Code
Revision Commission received through May 1, 2016); LA. CODE ANN.
ART. 103.1 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016 First
Extraordinary, Regular, and Second Extraordinary Sessions, for all
laws effective through December 31, 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2
(West, WestlawNext current with laws effective through L.2016, c. 55
and J.R. No. 6); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (West, WestlawNext current
through Chapters 93, 95 to 101 of the 2016 Regular Session of the
General Assembly, pending changes received from the Revisor of
Statutes); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (West, WestlawNext current
through the 2016 session, subject to technical revisions by the Code
Commissioner as authorized by law before official publication); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (West, WestlawNext current through the
laws of the Adjourned and Special Sessions of the 2015-2016
Vermont General Assembly (2016)); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (West,
WestlawNext Current through End of the 2016 Reg. Sess.). Virginia
appears under both the waiting period group and the complete
agreement group because the Old Dominion shortens the waiting
period for those more agreeable litigants.
35 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-2 (West, WestlawNext current with laws
effective through L.2016, c. 55 and J.R. No. 6). While New Jersey only
requires the parties agree on the grounds to avoid the long wait, this
could allow one party to leverage the other into a long wait, leaving
child or spousal support issues unaddressed.
36 See ALA. CODE § 30-2-1 (West, WestlawNext current through the
end of the 2016 Regular Session and through Act 2016–485 of the
32
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these states, parties must resolve all ancillary issues in
advance. 37 Whether the couple has children, numerous
property or business interests, or one party requires the support
of the other, everyone must agree to a resolution to avoid
having to prove fault. In most cases, including Tennessee, the
divorcing couple submits the agreement with the petition for
divorce. 38 Some states also subject the agreement to the court’s
scrutiny. 39
These statutes limit access to no-fault grounds,
increasing the likelihood that a divorce assumes an adversarial
posture that will resurrect the historically defective “kangaroo”
court procedures just to access the legal system and settle an
ancillary issue. Before adopting pure no-fault divorce, it was
estimated that at least ninety-five percent of California divorces
were uncontested dissolutions where fault was usually
unnecessary. 40 Funneling more litigants toward fault preserves
many of the issues surrounding the traditional fault-based
system.

2016 First Special Session); ALASKA STAT. § 25-24-200 (West,
WestlawNext current with Chapters 2-17, 19-24, 27, 33, 42-43, 52-53
and 55 from the 2016 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 29th Legislature); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (West, WestlawNext current with legislation
passed during the 2016 Session of the Georgia General Assembly)
(requiring complete agreement to avoid an appearance); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 580-42 (West, WestlawNext current through Act 1
(End) of the 2016 Second Special Session, pending revision by the
revisor of statutes) (using agreements similarly to Georgia); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 7-103 (West, WestlawNext Current through
all legislation from the 2016 Regular Session of the General
Assembly); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current
through 2016 released chapters 1-396); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (West,
WestlawNext Current through End of the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
37 See e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-102 (West, Westlaw current
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly).
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25-24-200 (West, WestlawNext current
with Chapters 2-17, 19-24, 27, 33, 42-43, 52-53 and 55 from the 2016
2nd Reg. Sess. of the 29th Legislature). Alaska requires not only
complete agreement but also that the agreement be “fair” as
determined by the court.
40 Kay, supra note 22, at 298.
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First, the complete agreement requirement needlessly
increases the costs involved in situations where the parties are
already dividing assets. 41 Moving toward no-fault divorce has
decreased costs associated with divorce. 42 The emotional toll
affects everyone involved. Why should divorce statutes
increase legal fees and other associated costs by requiring fault?
These savings could be used to support children or provide
mental health counseling, healthcare, and education. Lowering
costs and providing more resources at the marriage’s end may
also avoid other costs associated with future litigation over
changes in child or spousal support.
A state-by-state examination of divorce costs indicates
that no-fault divorce could decrease divorce costs, even though
the no-fault pioneer, California, maintains the highest divorce
costs in the nation. 43 States atop the list had much higher hourly
attorney fee rates and court filing fees. 44 While the state with the
cheapest divorce costs, Wyoming, had the lowest filing fee and
the second-lowest average for an attorney’s hourly rate. 45
Increased costs were found in states with higher costs of living,
such as California, Alaska, and New York. 46 Certainly, a wide
range of factors can cause divorce costs to increase, including
fault. States that take fault out of the divorce proceeding at least
streamline the process, which helps both states with higher and
lower hourly rates.

Erik V. Wicks, Comment, Fault-Based Divorce “Reforms,” Archaic
Survivals, and Ancient Lessons, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1565, 1582 (2000)
(citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 146 (4th ed.
1992)).
42 Cf. Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can
Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 69-70 (1991). This
author posits that no-fault divorce has lowered some litigation costs.
43 Elyssa Kirkham, The Best and Worst States to Get a Low-Cost
Divorce, Go Banking Rates (Feb. 3, 2016),
https://www.gobankingrates.com/personal-finance/best-worststates-low-cost-divorce/.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id; see also America’s Top States for Business 2016, CNBC,
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/12/
americas-top-states-for-business-2016-the-list-and-ranking.html (last
visited Dec. 8, 2016) (cost of living ranking).
41
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Second, requiring complete agreement pressures an
aggrieved party to compromise legal or economic outcomes to
avoid the harsh realities of fault-based divorce. In short, these
requirements provide leverage over weaker parties and could
force a less desirable outcome. 47 As former President Bill
Clinton taught us, human beings will go to great lengths to
avoid the embarrassment of publicly airing sordid details of
marital impropriety. 48
Last, burdening the marital dissolution process with
these agreements introduces the same danger that no-fault
divorce was designed to cure. These onerous requirements
force litigants, at least in some cases, to put on a fault-based
farce to settle ancillary issues in court. 49 Placing unnecessary
hurdles in the divorce gauntlet urges parties to lie and
denigrate the entire legal system.
New York provides an excellent example of just how
heinous fault-based divorce can become. The Empire State held
on to tradition, retaining adultery as the only grounds for
divorce until 1966. 50 Because widespread shenanigans were
occurring during divorce proceedings, as early as 1945 the
Committee on Law Reform of the City of New York advocated
for reform in the legislature. 51 The legislature finally conceded
in the 1960s and expanded the grounds for fault. 52 However,
no-fault grounds were not allowed in New York until 2010. 53
See Allen M. Parkman, Why are Married Women Working So Hard?,
18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 41 (1998). This article discusses how no-fault
divorce has affected settlement negotiations by pushing parties
toward equitable outcomes that place too little importance on
domestic contribution.
48 See Peter Baker & John F. Harris, Clinton Admits to Lewinsky
Relationship, Challenges Starr to End Personal ‘Prying’, WASHINGTON
POST (August 18, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/clinton/stories/clinton081898.htm.
49 See Kay, supra note 22, at 298; see also Sanford Katz, Historical
Perspective and Current Trends in the Legal Process of Divorce, 4 FUTURE
OF CHILDREN 1 (1994).
50 Zborovsky, supra note 20, at 309.
51 Katz, supra note 49, at 3.
52 Zborovsky, supra note 20, at 309.
53 Sophia Hollander, Divorces Drag on Even After Reform, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (May 6, 2012), available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023048113045773681
10112622548.
47
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Even then, New Yorkers were limited by an agreement
requirement. 54 Some states have addressed the realities of faultbased divorce by loosening these restrictions.

B. UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO NO-FAULT ALTERNATIVES
Not all divorces revolve around the elusive concept of
identifiable marital misconduct. Even with all fifty states
enacting no-fault divorce, some states place significant
limitations on the use of those grounds. 55 Although reasonable
minds can differ as to what qualifies as a significant limitation,
nineteen states have both fault and no-fault grounds for divorce
that allow litigants to use no-fault grounds without requiring
complete agreement as to ancillary issues. 56 Dissolving a
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current through
2016 released chapters 1-396).
55 See e.g., LA. CODE ANN. ART. 103.1 (West, WestlawNext current
through the 2016 First Extraordinary, Regular, and Second
Extraordinary Sessions, for all laws effective through December 31,
2016). The Pelican State requires a waiting period of 180 days
without minor children or 365 days with.
56 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (West, WestlawNext Current
through the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-Second Legislature
(2016)); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-40 (West, WestlawNext current with
enactments of the 2016 February Regular Session, the 2016 May
Special Session, and the 2016 September Special Session.); IDAHO
CODE § 32-603 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016 Second
Regular Session of the 63rd Idaho Legislature); IND. CODE § 31-15-2-3
(West, WestlawNext current with all legislation of the 2016 Second
Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
23-2701 (West, WestlawNext current through laws enacted during
the 2016 Regular and Special Sessions of the Kansas Legislature); ME.
STAT. TIT. 19-a, § 902 (West, WestlawNext Current with legislation
through the 2015 Second Regular Session of the 127th Legislature.
The Second Regular Session convened January 6, 2016 and
adjourned sine die April 29th, 2016. The general effective date is July
29, 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 208, § 1 (West, WestlawNext current
through Chapter 298 of the 2016 2nd Annual Session); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-5-2 (West, WestlawNext current through the End of the
2016 First and Second Extraordinary Sessions and the 2016 Regular
Session); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7-a (West, WestlawNext current
through Chapter 330 (End) of the 2016 Reg. Sess., not including
changes and corrections made by the State of New Hampshire,
54
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marriage in these states requires pleading only the no-fault
grounds, complying with statutory requirements, and then, if
needed, asking the court to decide unsettled issues inhibiting
the final dissolution of the marriage.
States with mixed divorce grounds still retain
traditional ideas of divorce, while also recognizing that no-fault
grounds produce many advantages. These state statutes
represent an intermediate step between the traditional full-fault
systems and no-fault systems implemented in states taking a
different approach to family law. Introducing no-fault divorce
would allow parties to proceed without an understanding that
some perjury will take place, permit the court to grant a divorce
without contorting the law outside of legislative intent, and
avoid committing the legal system to a charade that disrespects
the entire litigation process. 57

C. PURE NO-FAULT DIVORCE
Unsatisfied with how a fault-based system addressed
family law concerns, seventeen states have adopted a pure no-

Office of Legislative Services); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1 (West,
WestlawNext current through the end of the Second Regular and
Special Sessions of the 52nd Legislature (2016)); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-04-03 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016 Special
Session of the 64th Legislative Assembly and measures passed in the
June 14, 2016 election); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (West,
WestlawNext current through File 124 of the 131st General Assembly
(2015-2016)); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 43, § 101 (West, WestlawNext current
through Chapter 395 (End) of the Second Session of the 55th
Legislature (2016)); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301 (West, WestlawNext
current through 2016 Regular Session Acts 1 to 109); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-4-2 (West, WestlawNext current through 2016 Session
Laws and Supreme Court Rule 16-67); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001
(West, WestlawNext current through the end of the 2015 Regular
Session of the 84th Legislature); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-3 (West,
WestlawNext current through 2016 Third Special Session); W. VA.
CODE § 48-5-201 (West, WestlawNext current with legislation of the
2016 Regular Session, the 2016 First Extraordinary Session, and the
2016 Second Extraordinary Session).
57 See Sanford N. Katz, Historical Perspective and Current Trends in the
Legal Process of Divorce, 4 CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 1 (1994).
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fault system. 58 The language may vary, but the statutes contain
a consistent theme—divorce does not require proof of fault. As
states have progressed toward this model, naysayers have
forecast numerous scenarios that will upend society as we
know it. 59 But pure no-fault models simply remove an
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, WestlawNext current with
urgency legislation through Chapter 893 of 2016 Reg.Sess., Ch. 8 of
2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-106 (West, WestlawNext current through the
Second Regular Session of the 70th General Assembly (2016)); DEL.
CODE ANN. TIT. 13, § 1505 (West, WestlawNext current through 80
Laws 2016, ch. 430); FLA. STAT. § 61.052 (West, WestlawNext current
through the 2016 Second Regular Session of the Twenty-Fourth
Legislature); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/401 (West, WestlawNext current
through P.A. 99-904 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE § 598.17
(West, WestlawNext current with legislation from the 2016
Reg.Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.140 (West, WestlawNext
current through the end of the 2016 regular session); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 552.6 (West, WestlawNext current through P.A.2016, No. 314
of the 2016 Regular Session, 98th Legislature); MINN. STAT. § 518.06
(West, WestlawNext current with legislation through the end of the
2016 Regular Session.); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.305 (West, WestlawNext
current through the end of the 2016 Regular Session and Veto
Session of the 98th General Assembly, pending changes received
from the Revisor of Statutes. Constitution is current through the
November 4, 2014 General Election.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-104
(West, WestlawNext current through the 2015 session); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-353 (West, WestlawNext current through the end of the
104th 2nd Regular Session (2016)); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (West,
WestlawNext current through the end of the 78th Regular Session
(2015) and 29th Special Session (2015) of the Nevada Legislature and
all technical corrections received by the Legislative Counsel Bureau);
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.025 (West, WestlawNext current with 2016 Reg.
Sess. legislation eff. through 7/1/16 and ballot measures on the
11/8/16 ballot, pending classification of undesignated material and
text revision by the Oregon Reviser); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.030
(West, WestlawNext current with all laws from the 2016 Regular and
First Special Sessions of the Washington legislature that take effect
on or before July 1, 2016); WIS. STAT. § 767.315 (West, WestlawNext
current through 2015 Act 392, published 4/27/2016); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 20-2-104 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016
Budget Session).
59 See e.g., Peter Nash Swisher, Marriage and Some Troubling Issues with
No-Fault Divorce, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 243 (2004-2005). This article
58
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unnecessarily contentious aspect of divorce law. Most of these
states use the terms “irretrievably broken” or “irreconcilable
differences” for the legal ground. Parties may then settle a case
by agreement or move forward with litigation or mediation to
decide ancillary issues.
Pure no-fault does not leave parties without sufficient
remedies, even when fault is the predominant factor in the
divorce. For example, assume that a couple in a pure no-fault
state marries, maintaining that relationship for ten years and
has two children. Husband develops a prescription drug habit
that eventually leads to the demise of this marriage. Wife
decides the children should stay away from husband’s drug
habit and files for divorce. No-fault grounds would not cloak
the undesirable behavior of the husband. Rather, the court, or a
mediator in some cases, would take his behavior into account
when addressing child custody, property division, and
alimony. A court could then adjudicate ancillary issues using
the same equitable principles that the fault-based systems are
supposed to be based on. 60
Many litigants may avoid proof of fault altogether.
Determining an equitable distribution is not an exact science.
Parties may differ on the accounting methods used to
determine business values, 61 or haggle over the type of alimony
to be awarded. 62 Why should domestic relations laws force
parties to show fault for the court to decide these issues? This
appears a puzzling, unnecessary, and counterproductive
requirement. Fault advocates have argued that no-fault allows
litigants to skirt responsibility. 63 Other fault-based arguments
focus on outlier cases with controversial outcomes to disparage
the entire system. 64 These arguments against no-fault are
attributes increased divorce rates to the adoption of no-fault divorce
statutes.
60 See Bell, supra note 2, at 793-94.
61 See e.g., Powell v. Powell, 124 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
62 See e.g., Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2011).
63 Ellman, supra note 16, at 733. The author describes no-fault divorce
as reflecting “amoral thinking.”
64 See Swisher, supra note 59, at 254. The author uses In re Koch, 648
P.2d 406 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), as an example of no-fault removing
needed remedies for injured parties. In Koch, the court held that a
wife could not use her injuries from a physical altercation for the
basis of a spousal support claim. The wife’s tort case against the
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treated with more depth below. This back-and-forth does
emphasize that in each system individual judges and attorneys
will determine how efficiently and effectively the system
works. No perfect system exists, but no-fault systems reflect
reality and provide access to the judicial system that the faultbased system does not.

IV. NO-FAULT OPPONENTS BLAME THE SYSTEM FOR
UNRELATED SOCIETAL TRENDS
The beauty and utility of American democracy lies in
the struggle between liberal and conservative ideologies.
Middle ground has moved this country forward at a pace that
both respects our history and recognizes societal changes.
Certainly this system has its faults, 65 and divorce laws are not
immune to this struggle. The categories above demonstrate
how states have implemented divorce laws that reflect
divergent views of marriage. Since no-fault’s inception in 1970,
time has provided ammunition for both sides to take aim at the
other. No-fault opponents rely on a narrow, dystopian view of
the results in no-fault states to argue fault back into domestic
relations law.

A. NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND THE INCREASE IN DIVORCE
RATES
Ostensibly, divorce rates provide an elementary
indicator of no-fault’s allegedly adverse effect on society. While
relevant, divorce numbers only provide a small piece of the
entire puzzle. No-fault opponents argue that increased divorce
rates are directly related to no-fault divorce statutes. 66

husband for the same injury was pending at the time of the divorce
decree.
65 See, e.g., Eric Warner, Gridlock in Congress may Presage More of the
Same to Come, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/congress-clearsstopgap-spending-bill-11b-to-fight-zika/2016/09/28/d233ab9885e8-11e6-b57d-dd49277af02f_story.html.
66 Michael McManus, Confronting the More Entrenched Foe: The
Disaster of No-Fault Divorce and Its Legacy of Cohabitation, THE FAMILY

AGREE TO DISAGREE: MOVING TENNESSEE TOWARD PURE NO-FAULT DIVORCE

101

Overwhelmingly, the increase in the 1970s provides the basis
for this assertion. 67 This ignores a much longer trend—divorce
rates in America have been steadily rising since the 1860s. 68 One
might quickly correlate these increases to expansions in fault
and the development of no-fault divorce. But no-fault divorce
has only become more prolific since the 1970s. 69 In Tennessee
for example, divorce rates have leveled off and even declined
during that period. 70
Arguments based on divorce rates ignore numerous
other aspects that affect those numbers. If reducing divorce
numbers were as simple as making divorce more difficult, as
fault-based divorce certainly does, then barring divorce
altogether presumably would lower the rate to zero. As recently
as 1997, Ireland amended its constitution to permit divorce for
the first time in over 50 years. 71 The same arguments no-fault
detractors use were made in opposition to the constitutional
amendment permitting the Irish to obtain a divorce. 72 As the
IN AMERICA

(Spring 2011),
http://familyinamerica.org/files/9913/8757/6279/
FIA.Spring11.McManus.pdf.
67 See Swisher, supra note 59, at 243-44.
68 See 100 YEARS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS, 1973,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/
sr_21/sr21_024.pdf.
69 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current through
2016 released chapters 1-396). Even the most stringent holdouts
adopted no-fault grounds, providing some no-fault access in all 50
states.
70 Compare TENN. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND
DIVORCES WITH RATES PER 1,000 POPULATION BY COUNTY, TENNESSEE
RECORDED DATA, 2009, https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/
attachments/TN_Marriages_Divorces_-_2009.pdf, with TENN. DEP’T.
OF HEALTH, NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES WITH RATES PER
1,000 POPULATION BY COUNTY, TENNESSEE RECORDED DATA, 2014,
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/TN_Marr
iages_Divorces_-_2014.pdf; see also note 81, infra.
71 James F. Clarity, Before Date of New Law, Ireland Grants First Divorce,
N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 18 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/18/world/before-date-of-newlaw-ireland-grants-first-divorce.html.
72 Kate Holmquist, Divorce, Irish Style, THE IRISH TIMES (Jan. 17, 2015),
http://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/divorce-irish-style1.2068656.
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Irish realized, addressing family law issues requires more
nuance than a simple prohibition. 73
Wealth and education affect divorce numbers across the
country more than fault-based divorce statutes. Divorce rates
are obviously tied to marriage rates. Socioeconomic status and
education affect both marriage and divorce far more than nofault opponents give credence. 74 A Pew Research study in 2009
found that education levels correlated with both marriage
rates 75 and the average age at which people marry. 76 Although
the Pew study found no direct correlation between
socioeconomic status and divorce, socioeconomic status and
education affected the average marriage age, and age did show
a correlation to divorce rates. 77 This demonstrates only one
factor affecting divorce rates, while many other factors,
including religious affiliation, 78 foreign military engagements, 79
and economic recessions also affect divorce. 80 Presuming that
people will suddenly abandon a personal relationship or,
conversely, stay in a relationship based on a state’s legal
requirements ignores too many realities.

Id.
See Social and Demographic Trends, The States of Marriage and
Divorce, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 15, 2009)
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2009/10/15the-states-ofmarriage-and-divorce/.
75 Id.
76 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE: PATTERNS BY GENDER, RACE, AND EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT (2013),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/marriage-anddivorce-patterns-by-gender-race-and-educational-attainment-1.htm.
77 See Social and Demographic Trends, supra note 74.
78 See infra Part V.
79 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 100 YEARS OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES, 1867 – 1967,
supra note 68. Divorce rates rose around the time of the Second
World War.
80 D’Vera Cohn, Divorce and the Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (May 2, 2012),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/05/02/divorce-and-thegreat-recession/. This study found a correlation between foreclosure
and divorce rates but not between unemployment increase and
divorce rates.
73
74
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Over the past twenty-five years, divorce rates have
decreased in both no-fault and fault-based states. 81 The chart
below shows these trends using states that are close
geographically and have no-fault divorce statutes from each
category. Despite the three different approaches, divorce rates
have followed the same trend—a decline. 82 Kentucky’s pure nofault approach has at most a negligible impact on divorce rates.
These numbers do not corroborate the argument that no-fault
divorce equals increased divorce.

Divorce Rates per 1,000 People by State:
1990-2014
8
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2000

Tennessee (restricted use)
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B. NO-FAULT DIVORCE FAILS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
REMEDIES
Another argument against no-fault divorce is that
eliminating fault causes outcomes that fail to provide for
aggrieved parties. 83 No-fault opponents have argued that
victims of poor marital behavior lack any real recourse when
fault does not play a significant role in divorce. 84 Even then,

See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVORCE
RATES BY STATE: 1990, 1995, AND 1999-2014,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/state_divorce_rates_90_95_a
nd_99-14.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2016).
82 Id.
83 Swisher, supra note 59, at 254.
84 Id.
81
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fault advocates have still suggested tort and criminal law may
provide sufficient remedies. 85
No-fault divorce does not leave victims out in the cold,
and these other areas of law are better suited to remedy
particular types of marital misconduct. Criminal law reflects
society’s social norms for expected human behavior. 86 This
essential area of the law provides an efficient platform for
society to set moral expectations that place limitations in
various arenas when undesirable conduct occurs. 87 Physical
spousal abuse, behavior unquestionably in violation of society’s
social norms, could and should be addressed for the most part
in the criminal context. Moreover, defendants in criminal
procedures receive greater protections, including proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, right to confront
witnesses, and the right to a jury.
In the civil context, tort law provides compensatory
remedies outside of marriage dissolution. The evolution of
interspousal immunity allowed aggrieved parties access to
these tort remedies in a variety of situations. 88 Tort law
provides time-proven methods to calculate damages, while
retaining limits on claims too stale for remedy. 89 The principles
underpinning support and alimony laws were designed based
on an entirely different idea—equity. 90 Alimony in Tennessee,
for instance, focuses on the ability of the spouse seeking the
award to live post-divorce, the other spouse’s ability to pay the
award, and several other equitable factors. 91 In contrast, tort
remedies focus simply on the wrongful conduct and the

See id.
Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in
Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (2016).
87 See id.
88 See e.g., Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983) (holding
interspousal tort immunity is totally abolished in Tennessee); see also
Michelle L. Evans, Wrongs Committed During a Marriage: The Child
that No Area of the Law Wants to Adopt, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 466
(2009).
89 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 1-2 (AM. LAW INST. 2016).
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1995).
85
86

AGREE TO DISAGREE: MOVING TENNESSEE TOWARD PURE NO-FAULT DIVORCE

105

damage flowing from that conduct. 92 While similar policy
considerations may play a part in torts and domestic relations
law, the two are fundamentally different.
Divorce should focus on what it was designed to do—
dissolve a legal relationship. If the relationship is no longer
viable, i.e. irretrievably broken, then the court should only
require proof that the relationship is in fact broken and leave
the “why” for a possible factor for determining equitable
allocation of property, ordering support, or determining child
custody. The particulars as to the extent of damage caused or
the need for punishment to deter future incidences are better
left to criminal or tort law. Introducing these ideas into
marriage dissolution bogs down the process and confuses law
and equity. This could possibly cause important aspects of
marriage dissolution to be resolved inefficiently or in a manner
which cannot adequately address or deter undesirable conduct.
Simply put: A fault-based divorce is counterproductive.

C. NO-FAULT AVOIDS RESPONSIBILITY
Marriage symbolizes a certain amount of commitment
within a relationship. With commitment comes responsibility.
Some no-fault critics have contended the absence of fault not
only allows parties to avoid moral responsibilities, but also
allows certain behavior outside the contractual bonds of
marriage to go unpunished. 93 Conservative scholars have
argued that catastrophic consequences will result from the
ubiquity of divorce, even causing a decline in birth rates. 94 To

See, e.g., Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn.
2012).
93 Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 871 (June 1994). The authors argue that
changes in divorce law have rendered the marriage contract illusory.
94 See id. Brinig and Crafton discuss the decreasing birth rate when
marriage morphs into a long date. See Scott Drewianka, Divorce Law
and Family Formation, 21 J. POPULATION ECON. 484 (2006). Dr.
Drewianka’s article examines several studies that contend no-fault
divorce significantly contributed to the decline, and posits that nofault divorce had minimal effect on family structure.
92
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steal a line from the rock band R.E.M., under no fault- divorce
“it’s the end of the world as we know it.” 95
Chaining responsibility to fault is counterintuitive.
Child support is an established responsibility in which fault
need not play a role. Courts impose obligations that encourage
responsibility outside of marital relationships in every
jurisdiction. The traditionalist view of divorce holds fast to the
fault system to preserve the moral leverage interjected by fault
into divorce proceedings. Traditionalists use complete
agreements to impose that same leverage to a lesser degree.
Some have argued that alimony without fault has no teeth. 96
Yet, alimony statutes, such as Tennessee’s, consider a totality of
circumstances in each divorce with or without unscrupulous
behavior. 97 Removing fault does not render the marital contract
illusory, nor does it allow irresponsible behavior to proliferate.
Removing the impediments to no-fault grounds in
mixed states would allow parties to access an equitable system
for settling disputes. Unnecessary requirements force parties
into a fault-based paradigm that expands costs and increases
public humiliation. Forcing fault, by requiring complete
agreement or imposing long waits, possibly allows
irresponsible behavior to go unaddressed. At minimum,
litigants should have the no-fault option without coming to an
agreement. Imposing substantial conditions on no-fault
grounds is a thinly-veiled attempt to keep old fault-based
notions of divorce, rather than preventing some injustice.

V. DECLINING RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AFFECTS SOCIETAL
VIEWS ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Marriage certainly has roots that run deep into human
history. 98 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[m]arriage

R.E.M., It’s the End of the World as We Know It (And I Feel Fine), on
DOCUMENT (I.R.S. 1987).
96 See Brinig, supra note 93, at 877-78.
97 See, e.g., Gonsewki, supra note 62.
98 See Robert S. Walker, ET AL., Evolutionary History of Hunter-Gatherer
Marriage Practices, PLOS ONE (April 25, 2011),
https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/sdrewian/www/DivorceLawAndFa
milyFormation.pdf.
95
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is sacred to those who live by their religions.” 99 For much of
America’s history, an overwhelming majority of the population
identified with one faith or another. 100 Although our First
Amendment authors recognized the need for separation
between government and religion, 101 moral values based on
religious beliefs have been manifest through our governing
laws. 102 Laws governing marriage and marriage dissolution
should continue that process and reflect current societal change.
A declining emphasis on religious affiliation could signal the
next step for domestic relations law.

A. STUDIES SHOW A DECLINE IN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION
Religious belief and practice appears to be in decline
across the board, and in steep decline among younger
generations. A recent study from the Pew Research Center
reveals a decline in religious affiliation across the United
States. 103 A survey of more than 35,000 adults found that those
who say they believe in God has declined in recent years. 104 This
decline did not come from older adults, but overwhelmingly
from millennials. 105 Many of those millennials simply chose not
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
See e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Religion and the Founding of the
American Republic (last visited Sept. 5, 2016),
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/index.html; see also PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, Regional Distribution of Christians (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/global-christianityregions/.
101 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
102 See e.g., TENN. CONST. art. IX, § 2. Article IX, section 2 declares that
“no person who denies the being of God, or a future state of rewards
and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department of this
State.” See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a
Texas law banning homosexual intimate contact was
unconstitutional).
103 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious: Modest
Drop in Overall Rates of Belief and Practice, but Religious Affiliated
Americans Are as Observant as Before (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-lessreligious/.
104 Id.
105 Id.
99

100
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to identify with religion at all. 106 The percentage of adults who
were religiously unaffiliated rose sharply, with many
respondents claiming to have no belief in God whatsoever
(referred to in the study as “nones”). 107 Specifically, seven in ten
millennials say that religion has little to no importance in their
life. 108
Tennessee adults who identified as a “none” made up
fourteen percent of the total number. 109 This study noted a
significant decline in religious affiliation between 2007 and
2014. 110 Interestingly, Pew’s research found that adults in the
Volunteer State feel substantially more at peace than in the 2007
study. 111 These trends mirror those in Kentucky, where no-fault
divorce has persisted for decades. 112 In fact, downward trends
in religious affiliation were found across the southeastern
United States. 113
Recent Gallup numbers show that religious affiliation
has been on a steady decline for several decades. 114 The number
of people that have no religious affiliation has grown nearly
Id.
Id.
108 Id.
109 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adults in Tennessee (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/tennessee/.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in Kentucky (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/kentucky/.
113 See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in Alabama (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/alabama/; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in
Arkansas (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/state/arkansas/; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
Adult in Mississippi (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/mississippi/; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in
Georgia (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/state/gerogia/.
114 GALLUP, Religion: What is your religious preference – protestant,
Roman Catholic, another religion, or no religion?. (last visited Sept. 5,
2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx. This poll
shows the rise of the “nones” over several decades.
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107
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tenfold over the six decades covered in this survey. 115 These
numbers show that Americans are placing less and less
emphasis on religious beliefs. As younger generations of
Americans replace baby boomer populations, the percentage of
Americans who see the law through the lens of religious
teachings may fall substantially from where it is now. Looking
forward, a move toward less religion-based morality in
domestic relations law may align the law with the values of the
most affected population. Domestic relations law has followed
religious affiliation in the past. Why not now?

B. MARRIAGE IS INEXTRICABLY LINKED WITH RELIGION
American marriage finds its historical underpinnings
intertwined with religion. In religious context, the reverence
given the marital bond dates back to the book of Genesis, where
the Bible says “shall a man leave his father and his mother, and
shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall become one flesh.” 116
Islam also reveres the bond of marriage, encouraging followers
to marry in order to garner the favor of Allah. 117 Judaism
defines how a woman is “acquired” as either with money,
contract, or sexual intercourse. 118 All of the above, despite
subtle differences, refer to a relational bond between persons.
The law gives legal recognition to that relationship.
The progression of domestic relations law has tracked
America’s religious beliefs. Courts could not break the bond of
marriage in nineteenth century England. 119 Divorce law has
progressed and established divorce, expanded fault grounds,
and then developed no-fault grounds. 120 The decrease in
religious affiliation seems to accompany, at least in some
degree, that trend. That is not to say that the decline in religious
affiliation tells the whole story of increased divorce rates. It
does not. 121 But the correlation between marriage and religion

Id.
Genesis 2:22-24 (King James).
117 Surah 24:32.
118 Mishnah Kiddushin 1:1.
119 Bell, supra note 2, at 782.
120 See supra Part II.
121 See supra Part IV.
115
116
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is undeniable, and, as some conservatives might argue,
necessary to preserve the institution.
Divorce laws reflect the link between society’s concept
of marriage and religion. A quick survey comparing states
populating the Bible belt with more liberal states on the West
Coast reveals the philosophical dichotomy of marriage. 122
States in the Bible belt have higher religious affiliation than
states that began the no-fault divorce trend on the west coast. 123
This also explains why New York, with its large Catholic
population, has resisted the development of no-fault divorce. 124
With religious affiliation on the decline, even in the Bible belt,
fault-based divorce should follow suit.

Compare ALA. CODE § 30-2-1 (West, WestlawNext Current through
the end of the 2016 Regular Session and through Act 2016–485 of the
2016 First Special Session), and GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (West,
WestlawNext current with legislation passed during the 2016 Session
of the Georgia General Assembly), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-102
(West, WestlawNext Current through end of the 2016 Second
Regular and Second Extraordinary Sessions of the 109th Tennessee
General Assembly), with CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, WestlawNext
current with urgency legislation through Chapter 893 of 2016
Reg.Sess., Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess., and all propositions on
2016 ballot), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-106 (West, WestlawNext
current through the Second Regular Session of the 70th General
Assembly (2016)), and OR. REV. STAT. § 107.025 (West, WestlawNext
current with 2016 Reg. Sess. legislation eff. through 7/1/16 and
ballot measures on the 11/8/16 ballot, pending classification of
undesignated material and text revision by the Oregon Reviser).
Bible belt states hold fast to fault-based divorce by restricting access
to no-fault grounds in attempt to limit the divorce numbers.
California, Colorado and Oregon have discarded fault altogether,
focusing resources on other family law related issues.
123 Compare PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in Oregon (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/
religious-landscape-study/state/oregon/; with PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, Adult in Tennessee (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/tennessee/. Thirty-one percent of the Beaver state’s
adults do not affiliate with any religion. Compare that with eighteen
percent in Tennessee.
124 See Zborovsky, supra note 20.
122
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C. SOCIETAL CHANGES URGE DIVORCE LAW REFORM
Legal divorce, expanded fault grounds, and no-fault
divorce have all correlated with changes in society. 125 Divorce
laws should undergo legislative scrutiny as these changes
occur. A liberal movement preceded no-fault laws in states like
California, Oregon, and Colorado without catastrophic
consequences. 126 Kentucky, a state not necessarily known for its
progressive values, adopted a pure no-fault model in 1972. 127
The no-fault model in Kentucky has not significantly increased
the divorce rate. 128 Other changes were afoot across the United
States that affected those rising numbers.
The late 1960s and 1970s brought about a political
revolution that was reflected first in divorce statistics and then
the law. 129 A shift toward personal autonomy contributed to
legislatures reforming divorce laws. 130 The civil rights
movement, women’s liberation campaign, and the beginning of
the LGBT movement all represented a shift in American
politics. 131 Combined with an emotional antiwar movement, the
1960s pushed some American laws to the left, discarding
several traditionalist values entrenched for over 100 years. 132
See supra Part IV.
See, e.g., Kay, supra note 22.
127 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.140 (West, WestlawNext current
through the end of the 2016 regular session).
128 See KENTUCKY MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, Marriage & Divorce Rates by
County (last visited Jul. 20, 2016),
http://www.kentuckymarriage.org/marriage-inkentucky/marriage-divorce-rates-by-county/; see CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVORCE RATES BY STATE: 1990,
1995, AND 1999-2014, supra note 77.
129 See Perry, supra note 42, at 62.
130 Id.
131 See e.g. STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, PORT HURON
STATEMENT (1962), reprinted in Radical Reader 468 (Timothy
McCarthy & John McMillan eds. 2003). The Port Huron Statement
embodied the discontent of a younger generation with oppressive
civil rights. See e.g., BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963)
reprinted in Radical Reader 468 (Timothy McCarthy & John McMillan
eds. 2003). Friedan discusses the importance of femininity, and
points out the oppressive mores in American society.
132 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; see
also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; see also
125
126
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Political changes sculpted a new social landscape across
America, including no-fault divorce. More recently, millennials
have signaled conservative values that rose to prominence over
the past few decades are held in low regard now. 133
Lawmakers should heed this current evolution, and
reflect modern societal realities in divorce laws. As was the case
in the 1960s, younger generations come of age with different
values than their predecessors. Laws written generations ago
are ill-fitted to serve the population now living under them. 134
States could avoid this unnecessary friction by reevaluating
laws that no longer represent the governed, and that do not
address some societal ill. Declining religious affiliation,
particularly among millennials, tasks lawmakers with taking a
second look at restrictive divorce laws that have roots in
religious beliefs. Liberal movements of the 1960s and 70s
spurred no-fault statutes around the country, and the time is
ripe for conservative states to discard the leftovers of
yesteryear. Lawmakers should reevaluate divorce laws to
determine the necessity of complete agreement requirements
and extended waiting periods. In the spirit of providing access
to the courts to amicably resolve disputes, states should just
move to a pure no-fault divorce altogether.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Both legislative enactments and the
Roe opinion provide prominent examples of society departing from
what were once thought unshakeable traditional values.
133 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, The GOP’s Millennial Problem Runs Deep
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/25/the-gops-millennialproblem-runs-deep/. This study shows just how socially liberal
millennials are, while baby boomers are progressively more
conservative as age increases.
134 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015). The
legalization of gay marriage represents one example of societal
values changing the law. See also Colo. Const. art. 18, § 16.
Coloradans amended their state constitution in 2012 to allow the
legal possession and marketing of marijuana, joining Washington in
decriminalizing and regulating a substance society, especially the
younger demographic, saw as an acceptable personal choice.

AGREE TO DISAGREE: MOVING TENNESSEE TOWARD PURE NO-FAULT DIVORCE

113

VI. TENNESSEE SHOULD MOVE TOWARD PURE NO-FAULT
DIVORCE
Henry Drummond, depicting the part of attorney
Clarence Darrow in Inherit the Wind, a movie based on Dayton,
Tennessee’s Scopes Monkey Trial, declared to the court that “a
wicked law, like cholera, destroys everyone it touches. Its
upholders as well as its defiers.” 135 Granted, Tennessee’s
restrictive no-fault statute does not qualify as a wicked law. But
even laws noble at inception can produce perverse
consequences. The adverse effect of this law harms the very
people whom proponents of religious-based restrictions sought
to protect.

A. TENNESSEE KEEPS COSTS UP AND ACCESS DOWN
Lessening the no-fault burden would improve access to
Tennessee courts. The Volunteer State can ill-afford to force its
citizens to waste economic resources. Tennessee ranks in the
bottom quintile of states with the most people living in
poverty. 136 With contested divorce costs running in the
thousands of dollars, 137 those below the poverty line, along with
most middle class families, can easily be financially wiped out
after a contentious divorce proceeding. Tennessee already
holds the distinction for the highest bankruptcy rate. 138 Like any
INHERIT THE WIND (United Artists 1960).
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, PERCENT OF TOTAL
POPULATION IN POVERTY, 2014 (2016),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/county-level-datasets/poverty.aspx#P345c97c54e8c48339ab8327ebfca5161_2_233iT3.
This government survey found over 18% of Tennessee’s population
live below the poverty line and over 25% of Tennessee children ages
0-17 live below the poverty line.
137 This estimate was based on a $250.00 hourly rate, which is
considered the national average for a divorce attorney. See Kathleen
Michon, How Much Will My Divorce Cost and How Long Will it Take?,
NOLO (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/ctp/cost-of-divorce.html.
138 Dave Flessner, Tennessee Still Leads Nation in Bankruptcies,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Jan. 10, 2016),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/sto
ry/2016/jan/10/tennesssee-still-leads-nation135
136
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state, Tennessee’s poor have fewer property assets. But the poor
typically have more of one common point of emphasis in
divorce proceedings—children. 139 Tennessee’s family law
should focus on providing for these children or, at least, avoid
harming them by squandering precious economic resources on
fault-based divorce. Onerous agreement requirements may
force lower income litigants into inequitable agreements that
fail to address the best interest of affected parties, namely
children. 140 Equity and best interest aside, directing more
people toward fault-based divorce via agreement requirements
may cause other poor results.
Moving toward pure no-fault divorce would shift some
undesirable behavioral issues into criminal and tort forums
better suited to provide sufficient outcomes. Tennesseans
injured by conduct actionable in tort who are forced to litigate
under a fault-based family law proceeding may preclude future
litigation of the same conduct in a forum better situated to
provide a remedy. 141 Facts used in divorce proceedings to show
fault may not address all the damage that occurred due to the
equitable nature of divorce. With particularly egregious
behavior, criminal or not, res judicata may prevent an injured
plaintiff from seeking compensation for non-pecuniary harms
or forgo a punitive damages award. 142
These regrettable outcomes may arise more often in
communities with stronger ties to religious ideologies that are
resistant to no-fault divorce. Ironically, a recent study in the
bankruptcies/343890/. In 2015, Tennessee ranked number one in
bankruptcy filings for the 6th consecutive year.
139 Yang Jiang, ET AL., Basic Facts About Low Income Children,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, (Feb. 2016)
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_1145.pdf. Children
comprise twenty-three percent of the total population but thirty-two
percent of all people in poverty, signaling a higher ratio of children
among those in poverty.
140 Cf. Parkman, supra note 43, at 42. This author discusses the
changing landscape of divorce negotiation after no-fault divorce.
141 See Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). In Kemp,
the court held that the doctrine of res judicata prevented her suit
against her husband for assault and battery because her divorce
award was based on the same facts.
142 See id.; see also Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in NoFault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 305 (1997).
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American Journal of Sociology found the best indicator for
increased divorce by county was the concentration of
evangelicals or conservatives in that county. 143 To wit,
restrictions based on conservative religious beliefs
disproportionately affect the people who support no-fault
divorce opponents. This same study identified that low income
and lower educational attainment were directly related to
higher incidences of divorce—both were common
characteristics found in southern, conservative communities. 144
Moreover, communities that increasingly encouraged
abstinence until marriage sustained higher incidences of
divorce. 145 Rural communities – typically poorer and steadfast
in their faith – deserve better.

B. TENNESSEE COURTS CONFUSE THE ISSUE
The complete agreement requirement has such little
relevance to actually dissolving the marriage that Tennessee
courts have confused the issue. 146 In 1995, the Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed a decision that held that a wife had
substantially contributed to property owned by her husband
before the marriage. 147 The Harrison court held that the real
property in dispute was not marital property and that the wife
was not entitled to share in the value. 148 The majority opinion
glossed over the ground for this divorce—irreconcilable
differences. 149 Tennessee’s complete agreement requirements
predates the decision in Harrison, 150 and shows just how much
sense this requirement actually makes. Appellate court
Press Release, Jennifer Glass, Red States, Blue states, and Divorce:
Understanding the Impact of Conservative Protestantism on
Regional Variation in Divorce Rates, Counsel on Contemporary
Families (Jan. 16, 2014), https://contemporaryfamilies.org/impactof-conservative-protestantism-on-regional-divorce-rates/.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See Harrison v. Harrison, 912 S.W.2d 124 (Tenn. 1995).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 124.
150 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (West, WestlawNext current
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly).
143
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decisions after Harrison have amended or remanded trial court
judgments that granted divorce based on irreconcilable
differences for failing to comply with the statute. 151
A simplification of the divorce statute would make the
judicial task easier and more efficient. If parties could petition
for divorce on only one ground, confusion would be unlikely.
Discarding the agreement requirement would limit the cases
where a divorce is bounced back-and-forth between appellate
and trial courts to comply with a misunderstood statutory
requirement. These cases show the room for improvement.
Tennessee lawmakers have made clear the conservative
agenda that takes priority in the Tennessee legislature. 152
Traditional conservatives should operate with an eye toward a
restrained form of government that believes less is more, rather
than moral populism operating under the guise of
conservatism. Conservatives love to quote Ronald Reagan who
said, “[g]overnment is not the solution to the problem;
government is the problem.” 153 The underpinnings of faultbased divorce fit well under President Reagan’s statement.
Tennessee’s no-fault statute burdens domestic relations law
with enforcing archaic values on a generation that increasingly
does not share those same values. Continuing to restrict nofault divorce ignores current economic and cultural realties. In
short, the situation has changed and so should the law.
Conservative states like Tennessee should recalibrate divorce
laws to reflect true conservative principles.

VII. CONCLUSION
Tennessee domestic relations law should follow the
current societal trends and loosen the restrictions on no-fault
divorce. Keeping with traditional mores, the legislature persists
See Cook v. Cook, No. E2016–00042–COA–R3–CV, 2016 WL
3679415 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2016); Norris v. Norris, No. E2014–
02353–COA–R3–CV, 2015 WL 9946262 (Aug. 24, 2015).
152 See Joel Ebert, Tennessee’s 2016 Legislative Session: Key Moments, Key
People, THE TENNESSEAN (Apr. 23, 2016),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2016/04/23/ten
nessees-2016-legislative-session-key-moments-keypeople/83400506/.
153 Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Inaugural Address
(Jan. 20, 1981).
151
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in requiring a complete agreement to avoid the expense and
contentiousness of fault. To what end? Forcing parties to prove
fault increases costs, decreases access and complicates matters
even further.
Tennessee’s statute runs the risk of unnecessarily
compromising desirable outcomes that could preclude further
litigation needed to address more severe misconduct. Pure nofault has not allowed people to avoid responsibility,
significantly increased divorce rates, or adversely affected
aggrieved parties. Besides the societal ills of fault-based
divorce, the current statute has confused parties, attorneys, and
courts. This increases costs and burdens the court system. Other
remedies, when combined with pure no-fault divorce, more
effectively address Tennessee’s domestic issues.
Declining religious affiliation in younger generations
and the undesirable consequences of fault-based divorce
should compel Tennessee lawmakers to take a second look at
the state’s current no-fault statute. Even if a pure no-fault model
remains infeasible, Tennessee should remove the complete
agreement requirement to plead irreconcilable differences,
allowing litigants to access the court system without proof of
fault. In other words, Tennessee should allow divorcing
couples to just agree to disagree.

